This paper introduces and analyzes a model of supervised work group where subordinates decide how to exert their effort in complementary tasks while the supervisors decide incentives. Incentives may be a combination of individual and group-based ones. The optimality of incentives is analyzed when considering two different cost functions for subordinates. The two cost functions describe different individual motivations; comparing the resulting effort allocations and production optimality, we can relate them to different organizational theories. Our results provide a measure of how motivation among subordinates may affect production and incentives. Furthermore, the optimal incentives schemes are examined in terms of Adams’ equity theory.
|Codice identificativo ISI:||WOS:000281107200031|
|Codice identificativo Scopus:||2-s2.0-77955553314|
|Titolo:||Incentives and individual motivation in supervised work groups|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|