This paper examines in what way Hegel deals with the representation of God's properties, with particular reference to two traditional problems : The problem of their compatibility and the problem of the equivocality or univocity between Divine and human attributes. The following hypotheses will be defended : Hegel refuses the pretention of knowing God by attributing him many predicates - which he considers the fundamental mistake of the rational theology - but he doesn't considers all the divines attributes as representations which have no speculative value and have also to disappear in the transition from the religious Representation to the Concept ; he affirms on the contrary the correspondence between the predicates of omnipotence, goodness, justice and wisdom with the determinations of the Concept ; the speculative transposition of these attributes has to be regarded as a constitutive part of Hegel's theodicy, because it represents a reply -Alternative to Leibniz's one -T o Bayle's anti-Theodicy, grounded on the affirmation of an insoluble contradiction between divines goodness, justice and all-power ; finally, the clarification of the dialectic relationship that Hegel establish between God's justice and wisdom -T hrough their speculative interpretation -Allows to gain a clear view on the way he conceives the relationship between human and divine justice, which is here examined through an analysis of his interpretation of Job's book.
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rmm.164.0459|
|Codice identificativo Scopus:||2-s2.0-85002062985|
|Titolo:||La transposition spéculative des attributs divins et la « véritable théodicée » de Hegel|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|