In the near future, the Italian retirement system will be based on a “Non!nancial De!ned Contribution” scheme: the minimum age at retirement and pension annuity will depend on the evolution of life expectancy, computed on the whole population by the National Institute of Statistics. We developed a methodology to project into the future the di"erential longevity by education, ensuring at same time coherence between our estimates and the o#cial projections of population size and vital rates, as computed by the National Institute of Statistics. We projected life tables by social groups and simulated age at retirement and pension annuity considering both the average values of the whole population and the speci!c values of two groups: low educated (i.e. less than Secondary Education level – ISCED levels: 0-2) and high educated (i.e. at least Secondary Education level – ISCED levels: 3 or more). We show how ignoring the interactions between di"erential mortality and demographic structure of a population, in the computation of minimum legal age at retirement and pension annuity, has potential and unexpected increasing regressive e"ects, redistributing time (of retirement) and pension annuity from the low educated group (with lower life expectancy) to the high educated group (with higher life expectancy).

Gli effetti regressivi inattesi del sistema pensionistico italiano nel prossimo futuro

Sergio Ginebri;Carlo Lallo
2022-01-01

Abstract

In the near future, the Italian retirement system will be based on a “Non!nancial De!ned Contribution” scheme: the minimum age at retirement and pension annuity will depend on the evolution of life expectancy, computed on the whole population by the National Institute of Statistics. We developed a methodology to project into the future the di"erential longevity by education, ensuring at same time coherence between our estimates and the o#cial projections of population size and vital rates, as computed by the National Institute of Statistics. We projected life tables by social groups and simulated age at retirement and pension annuity considering both the average values of the whole population and the speci!c values of two groups: low educated (i.e. less than Secondary Education level – ISCED levels: 0-2) and high educated (i.e. at least Secondary Education level – ISCED levels: 3 or more). We show how ignoring the interactions between di"erential mortality and demographic structure of a population, in the computation of minimum legal age at retirement and pension annuity, has potential and unexpected increasing regressive e"ects, redistributing time (of retirement) and pension annuity from the low educated group (with lower life expectancy) to the high educated group (with higher life expectancy).
https://economiaitaliana.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/EI_2022_3_04_S_Ginebri_Lallo_D.pdf
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11695/129374
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