The research examines the phenomenon of decentralized finance (DeFi), investigating its technological foundations, ideological premises, and legal implications, with the aim of assessing the actual compatibility of such models with traditional regulated financial systems. DeFi is based on the use of blockchain technology and Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT), which enable the circulation and management of value without relying on central authorities or supervised intermediaries, through computer protocols and self-executing smart contracts. According to the dominant narrative, this architecture would allow the disintermediation of financial markets and the democratization of access to economic services. A critical analysis of the technological infrastructure and governance dynamics, however, shows that the promise of a truly decentralized financial system presents significant structural limitations. The functioning of blockchains requires shared technical rules, consensus mechanisms, and protocol updates that assign a decisive role to developers, validators, and operators with substantial economic and technological resources. In this way, decision-making power is not eliminated but rather tends to concentrate in new forms of technical and private intermediation, often outside traditional regimes of responsibility and supervision. The research also reconstructs the relationship between DeFi and traditional financial intermediation, highlighting how the typical functions performed by intermediaries — resource allocation, risk management, user protection, and market stability — cannot be fully replaced by algorithmic mechanisms. Technology may improve the efficiency of financial processes, but it does not eliminate the need for centers of responsibility and regulatory safeguards. Particular attention is devoted to the legal qualification of DeFi instruments, including crypto-assets, cryptocurrencies, and smart contracts, and to the attempt to frame them within existing legal categories, also in light of the taxonomy introduced by the European MiCAR Regulation. The analysis shows that these phenomena still operate within an incomplete regulatory framework, exposed to risks of regulatory arbitrage and to the emergence of a parallel financial system less subject to institutional oversight. The examination of the main DeFi applications — including Initial Coin Offerings, decentralized lending, and DAOs — further confirms the ambiguities of the model, showing how the promise of disintermediation often coincides with the reappearance of new centers of power and intermediary infrastructures. The research ultimately concludes that decentralization, rather than representing a true overcoming of intermediary-based finance, constitutes a transformation in the ways economic and decision-making power is exercised. DeFi does not appear capable of replacing the regulated financial system; rather, it may serve as a stimulus for the technological evolution of traditional financial intermediation, provided that it operates within a regulatory framework capable of ensuring market stability and investor protection.
La ricerca analizza il fenomeno della finanza decentralizzata (DeFi), indagandone le basi tecnologiche, i presupposti ideologici e le implicazioni giuridiche, con l’obiettivo di valutare la reale compatibilità di tali modelli con i sistemi finanziari tradizionali regolati. La DeFi si fonda sull’utilizzo della tecnologia blockchain e delle Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT), che consentono la circolazione e la gestione del valore senza il ricorso ad autorità centrali o intermediari vigilati, attraverso protocolli informatici e smart contract autoesecutivi. Secondo la narrativa dominante, tale architettura permetterebbe la disintermediazione dei mercati finanziari e la democratizzazione dell’accesso ai servizi economici. L’analisi critica dell’infrastruttura tecnologica e delle dinamiche di governance mostra tuttavia come la promessa di una finanza realmente decentralizzata presenti significativi limiti strutturali. Il funzionamento delle blockchain richiede infatti regole tecniche condivise, meccanismi di consenso e aggiornamenti del protocollo che attribuiscono un ruolo determinante a sviluppatori, validatori e operatori dotati di rilevanti risorse economiche e tecnologiche. In tal modo il potere decisionale non viene eliminato, ma tende piuttosto a concentrarsi in nuove forme di intermediazione tecnica e privata, spesso sottratte ai tradizionali regimi di responsabilità e vigilanza. La ricerca ricostruisce inoltre il rapporto tra DeFi e intermediazione finanziaria tradizionale, evidenziando come le funzioni tipiche degli intermediari — allocazione delle risorse, gestione dei rischi, tutela degli utenti e stabilità dei mercati — non possano essere integralmente sostituite da meccanismi algoritmici. La tecnologia può migliorare l’efficienza dei processi finanziari, ma non elimina l’esigenza di centri di responsabilità e di presidi regolatori. Particolare attenzione è dedicata alla qualificazione giuridica degli strumenti della DeFi, tra cui criptoattività, criptovalute e smart contract, e al tentativo di ricondurli alle categorie giuridiche esistenti, anche alla luce della tassonomia introdotta dal Regolamento europeo MiCAR. L’indagine evidenzia come tali fenomeni si collochino ancora in un’area regolatoria incompleta, esposta a rischi di arbitraggio normativo e alla formazione di una finanza parallela meno sottoposta ai controlli istituzionali. L’esame delle principali applicazioni della DeFi — tra cui Initial Coin Offering, lending decentralizzato e DAO — conferma le ambiguità del modello, mostrando come la promessa di disintermediazione si accompagni spesso alla ricomparsa di nuovi centri di potere e di infrastrutture intermediarie. L’indagine giunge quindi alla conclusione che la decentralizzazione, più che rappresentare un reale superamento della finanza intermediata, costituisce una trasformazione delle forme di esercizio del potere economico e decisionale. La DeFi non appare in grado di sostituire il sistema finanziario regolato, ma può piuttosto rappresentare uno stimolo per l’evoluzione tecnologica dell’intermediazione tradizionale, purché inserita in un quadro normativo capace di garantire stabilità dei mercati e tutela degli investitori.
La finanza decentralizzata tra innovazione tecnologica e limiti regolatori. Profili giuridici e prospettive di compatibilità con l'intermediazione tradizionale
SANTUCCI, Michela
2026-04-22
Abstract
The research examines the phenomenon of decentralized finance (DeFi), investigating its technological foundations, ideological premises, and legal implications, with the aim of assessing the actual compatibility of such models with traditional regulated financial systems. DeFi is based on the use of blockchain technology and Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT), which enable the circulation and management of value without relying on central authorities or supervised intermediaries, through computer protocols and self-executing smart contracts. According to the dominant narrative, this architecture would allow the disintermediation of financial markets and the democratization of access to economic services. A critical analysis of the technological infrastructure and governance dynamics, however, shows that the promise of a truly decentralized financial system presents significant structural limitations. The functioning of blockchains requires shared technical rules, consensus mechanisms, and protocol updates that assign a decisive role to developers, validators, and operators with substantial economic and technological resources. In this way, decision-making power is not eliminated but rather tends to concentrate in new forms of technical and private intermediation, often outside traditional regimes of responsibility and supervision. The research also reconstructs the relationship between DeFi and traditional financial intermediation, highlighting how the typical functions performed by intermediaries — resource allocation, risk management, user protection, and market stability — cannot be fully replaced by algorithmic mechanisms. Technology may improve the efficiency of financial processes, but it does not eliminate the need for centers of responsibility and regulatory safeguards. Particular attention is devoted to the legal qualification of DeFi instruments, including crypto-assets, cryptocurrencies, and smart contracts, and to the attempt to frame them within existing legal categories, also in light of the taxonomy introduced by the European MiCAR Regulation. The analysis shows that these phenomena still operate within an incomplete regulatory framework, exposed to risks of regulatory arbitrage and to the emergence of a parallel financial system less subject to institutional oversight. The examination of the main DeFi applications — including Initial Coin Offerings, decentralized lending, and DAOs — further confirms the ambiguities of the model, showing how the promise of disintermediation often coincides with the reappearance of new centers of power and intermediary infrastructures. The research ultimately concludes that decentralization, rather than representing a true overcoming of intermediary-based finance, constitutes a transformation in the ways economic and decision-making power is exercised. DeFi does not appear capable of replacing the regulated financial system; rather, it may serve as a stimulus for the technological evolution of traditional financial intermediation, provided that it operates within a regulatory framework capable of ensuring market stability and investor protection.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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