The Italian foreign policy in the domain of energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean in the XXI century: a Neoclassical realist approach

Over the past two decades, the Eastern Mediterranean has emerged as a strategic region for global energy security, particularly in the domain of natural gas. Italy, as a major energy importer and Mediterranean power, has a vested interest in the region's evolving dynamics and the implications for its foreign policy. The discovery of significant gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean, coupled with the unresolved disputes over maritime boundaries and ownership rights, has created a complex web of strategic interactions among regional and global actors. Italy's foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean is shaped not only by its energy needs, but also by its historical ties, geopolitical interests, and alignment with key partners such as the United States and its membership status ties to the European Union. The first major discoveries of natural gas fields in the early 2010s have led to numerous tensions in a region that already didn’t enjoy established stability. The Cyprus question and the de facto split status of the island became even more entangled after the discovery of natural gas fields in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus since Turkey has manifested its interest on exploiting them through the maritime border claims of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The instability of the MENA region after the 2011 Arab springs has played also a role in destabilizing the Eastern Mediterranean. On this instance, the status of Libya is of particular importance since the de facto split status of the country has led to other countries of the region, also EU countries, to either back the internationally recognized Government of National Unity, based in Tripoli, or the Libyan National Army led by General Haftar backed government in Tobruk. Also in this contest, the role of Turkey has been important since the 2019 maritime border agreement with the Tripoli-based Government of National accord that led and still leads in heightened tensions with Greece. This new assertive Turkish foreign policy has been framed within its Mavi Vatan (Blue homeland) doctrine. Turkish relations have worsened also with regards to other actors of the region such as Egypt and Israel that led to the exclusion of Turkey from regional cooperation attempts such as the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. To understand Italy's strategic behaviour in this context, this research adopts a Neoclassical realist approach in the domain of international relations theories, which seeks to integrate domestic and international factors in explaining State behaviour. The Neoclassical realist approach, which combines systemic and domestic factors, provides a useful framework for understanding Italy's foreign policy behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean. By examining the interplay between Italy's domestic factors, such as its economic interests, political institutions, and societal preferences, and the systemic factors, such as the regional and global power dynamics, this research aims to shed light on Italy's foreign policy decisions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Through an analysis of Italy's bilateral and multilateral relations with key actors in the region, including Libya, Egypt, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, this study seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of Italy's role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the factors that have shaped its foreign policy behaviour. The first chapter is dedicated to the understanding the basics of the evolution of realist thought since Ancient Greece until the birth of Neoclassical realism in the 1990s. Thucydides’ Peloponnesian Wars laid the foundations of some realist variables in international relations theory such as the centrality of the State as well as the importance of power as a factor that determines the international relations dynamics. Machiavelli’s The Prince from the era of Renaissance Italy has added the importance of rejecting moral and ethical standards in favour of a practical and pragmatic use of power, the latter being framed in its most material aspects, such as military power. Hobbes’ modern era addition of the self-interested nature and self-preserving behaviour in humankind, also applied in the international system formed by States has been seminal in the realist paradigm. Nevertheless, it is E. H. Carr’s The Twenty years’ Crisis 1919-1939, published in 1939, that has been widely considered the foundational text in the study of International Relations as an academic subject, and especially for the realist theory. The centrality of the State, anarchic nature of international politics, the importance of historical context in understanding international politics, the role of the threat of force and the conflictive nature of international politics have been masterfully introduced by Carr in academia and in the realist paradigm. Morgenthau’s seminal book, Politics among nations, has been widely regarded as a cornerstone of the realist school of thought in international relations. The introduction of the centrality of national interest and its pursuit by States in the international arena as well as the importance of the struggle of power among them in order to guarantee their security and the overall balance of power among nations are all principles that have clearly impacted to this day international relations and the realist theory. The major shift of paradigm within the realist school of thought was introduced by Kenneth Waltz in the 1970s thanks to his neorealist theory introduced by his famous book Theory of International Politics. According to the latter it is the international system’s structure that dictates the posture each State can adopt within the system itself. The shift from giving more importance to the single foreign policies of States to giving more importance to the structure of the international system and hence to the constrictions and available options for foreign policy choices has been a major one. Waltz’s neorealist theory is also known as defensive neorealism since the scope of States is to maintain a balance of power equilibrium in order to secure their survival. John Mearsheimer, although agreeing on major neorealist principles introduced by Waltz, argued that the States seek hegemony in order to secure their survival thus introducing the offensive neorealist theory. The chapter goes on focusing on the main innovations of Neoclassical realism within the realist school as well as its general theoretical framework. The Neoclassical realist theory was introduced by Gideon Rose in 1998 mainly as a foreign policy theory but since then it has been developed by many realist scholars such as Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, and Jeffrey Taliaferro into becoming a genuine theory of international relations within the realist school of thought. Neoclassical realism accepts some main neorealist principles, such as the centrality of the State and the predominance of the international system’s constraints over the States’ choices of foreign policy. Nevertheless, Neoclassical realism introduces numerous intervening variables between the international system and the State that play a crucial role in the perception of the system by the States. Neoclassical realism also introduces some very important classical realist variables regarding the nature of the State and its core national interests as determinant variables in the equation that will result in a foreign policy choice. Variables such as leader image, and State-society relations are also close to Alexander Wendt’s constructivist theory of international relations. Finally, the chapter closes analysing the main criticism on Neoclassical realism by both realist and non-realist scholars of international relations, the main one being that it is too holistic, and thus eclectic, by non-realist scholars and betraying neorealist core principles by realist, mostly neorealist, scholars. The second chapter is focused on a geopolitical analysis of the main State actors in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as the main complicacies and disputes of the area. The Eastern Mediterranean is mainly divided geologically in two basins: the Ionian basin, comprising Italy, Albania, and Greece, and the Levant basin, comprising Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Cyprus, and Libya. The focus will be mainly set on the Levant basin. The analysis is pursued through the observation of the main demographic, economic, and political data available, with a special focus on natural resources capabilities and assets. Each country shall be thus scrutinized. The second paragraph is dedicated in shedding some light on the most relevant geopolitical issues, such as the Cyprus question and Turkish assertiveness in the area, shall be briefly introduced in order to obtain a general overview of the regional interState system and its fracture points, our independent variable. Also, non-regional actors’ interests in the area will be considered, such as China, Russia, the United States, and the EU. Finally, the last paragraph of the chapter focuses on the Eastmed gas pipeline and the birth of the East Mediterranean gas forum (EMGF) in 2019. Such diplomatic enterprise is the result of Turkish assertiveness in the area and the counterbalancing action, on a diplomatic field, by countries such as Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, and Israel. The EMGF could be the ideal platform, a light diplomatic tool, in order for cooperation among States to arise in the management of natural gas and other resources in the area. The intergovernmental platform, nonetheless, suffers from the absence of a major regional player, Turkey, without which frictions could only escalate in the area. Thus, an important task of the regional actors, as well as of other international actors, would be to define a path through which renewed cooperation with Turkey could be achieved. The third, and final, chapter offers a historical analysis of Italy’s role and its energy diplomacy in the Mediterranean since the birth of the Republic. Since the birth of ENI under the leadership of Enrico Mattei, Italy had a major interest in guaranteeing the necessary annual energy supply as a means to allow the growth of its industry, and the energetic needs of post-war Italy. In the Cold war international chessboard Italy had to navigate turbulent waters since the international setting was very rigid and its allegiance to the Western world being undisputed since the 1948 parliamentary election that set Italy solidly and structurally in the Western bloc. This notwithstanding, Mattei strived to penetrate with ENI the oil cartel formed by the notorious Seven sisters, the seven most important western oil companies and strike deals with MENA region countries so as to allow new kind of oil deals, that would be more careful towards the oil exporting country’s needs for development growth and a fairer share of the profits. The Mattei formula became famous and thus it rallied the wrath of the Seven sisters. Nevertheless, since then Italy’s foreign policy became inextricably bound to energy diplomacy and the importance of the Mediterranean region, once more, became evident for the supply of energy and for energy security. The second paragraph is dedicated in observing nowadays Italy’s posture vis-à-vis the EastMed pipeline project, and the EMGF. Italy’s position regarding the EastMed pipeline has crossed many ups and downs since the conception of the project in the 2010s. The pipeline has been alternatively seen as a strategic or an economic project, these two visions having different posits and different consequences. As of today, the technical viability of the project is confirmed while the economic viability of it is still debated. On the strategic plan, the importance and the opportunities offered by a pipeline that would bind the Eastern Mediterranean to Italy, and thus Europe, are numerous. On the one hand, the fear of Italian decision makers is that such project would lead to escalation in the relations with Turkey, since the latter is not part of the project, while other decision makers believe that such project would both counterbalance Turkey’s actions and it would provide a sound possibility of collaboration once tensions have been dissipated to all parties on equal terms and in respect of international law and institutions. Italy has also participated in the creation of the EMGF and is a founder member of it. Much possibility lies for Italian diplomatic action through the Forum if it becomes a target of Italian foreign policy interest and thus worthy of a further investment in terms of resources, both human and economic. Finally, the last paragraph introduces the analysis of the main Italian domestic factors, the domestic variables suggested by Neoclassical realist theory, that shape Italian posture in the area, and tests the adaptability of the theory to the foreign policy outcome taking into account first and foremost the independent, and intervening variables as suggested by Neoclassical realist theory. As the reader shall note, the main results prove that Italian foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean can be explained successfully by Neoclassical realism in its foreign policy theory form, especially thanks to the discrepancy between what would the independent variable, stemming from the international and regional systems’ constrictions suggest as foreign policy outcome, and the actual foreign policy outcome. Such discrepancy can be explained thanks to the intervening variables of Neoclassical realism. The result of the research was the confirmation of the validity of the Neoclassical realist theory. In particular, the leader image, but even more so the strategic culture can help explain reasonably the choices Italy took in its energy diplomacy within its broader foreign policy with regards to the Eastern Mediterranean. These two factors helped explain the inability of Italy to have a more impactful role in managing the Libyan crisis since 2011, as well as to why it has an overly accommodating, reactive, almost apprehensive, posture towards engaging more proactively in the Eastern Mediterranean with respect to the natural gas fields that are explored, operated, marketized by Eni. The Eastmed pipeline project is a valid choice, though mostly a geopolitical and long-term solution, while the Egyptian LNG terminals offer a softer solution, but a short-term and an insufficient one vis-à-vis the strategic needs of Italy in the energy domain. Italy has the prerequisites to become a security provider in the Levantine sub-region in collaboration with other like-minded countries, while continuing to strive for an agreement with Turkey in order to stabilise Libya and finding a collectively profitable modus vivendi with regards to the natural resources discovered in the Levantine basin. The recent Italian navy operation Mediterraneo Sicuro is definitely on the right path towards becoming a security provider actor in the area. Its aeronaval device should be still enhanced though, since the new operation covers a far greater area than the previous one of 2015, relegated to the Central Mediterranean, though the number of warships and aircraft has not increased as of now. The Italian navy is one of the most powerful ones in the Mediterranean, thus offering the perfect opportunity to become a security provider but also to undertake joint security provision missions with allied or partner countries of the area. By examining Italy's foreign policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean in the XXI century, this study aims to contribute to the broader debate on the role of middle powers in the evolving global order and the implications for international security and cooperation.