The EU Law on liberalised public services introduced into national legal orders general and sectoral obligations of accounting, corporate and ownership separation between activities carried out under monopoly and activities carried out under market conditions. By examining the specific provisions of the sector, it is possible to define a general legal principle applicable to all services sectors characterized by the existence and relevance of a (structural) network. This conclusion is confirmed by the introduction of an antitrust rule that imposes, as a general rule, for those services, an obligation of corporate separation between monopoly and competitive activities. While the requirements of transparency and the promotion of pluralism make it, on the one hand, an antitrust principle and, on the other, a principle of asymmetric regulation, certain conflicts nevertheless arise between the respective disciplines (the regulatory one and the competitive one). The concrete solution of applying unbundling to each sector should be based on an economic analysis of the technical and structural characteristics of the relevant market. Although it is not possible to theorize, in abstract terms, an optimal unbundling rule for the opening to competition of Italian public services, variations in the intensity of the principle guarantee the suitability of the instrument to meet different application conditions in time and circumstances. The greatest problems of effectiveness of such a measure are generally linked to the ability of national regulators to develop and enforce compliance by market operators.

La disciplina comunitaria dei servizi pubblici liberalizzati ha introdotto negli ordinamenti nazionali obblighi generali e settoriali di separazione contabile, societaria e proprietaria fra attività svolte in regime di monopolio e attività svolte in condizioni di mercato. Dall'esame delle specifiche disposizioni di settore è possibile definire un principio giuridico generale applicabile a tutti i servizi a rete. Tale conclusione trova conferma nell'introduzione di una norma antitrust che impone, in via generale, per quei servizi, un obbligo di separazione societaria tra attività in monopolio e attività in concorrenza. Se le esigenze di trasparenza e di promozione del pluralismo ne fanno, da un lato, un principio antitrust e, dall'altro, un principio di regolazione asimmetrica, alcuni conflitti tuttavia si pongono tra le rispettive discipline (regolativa e della concorrenza). La soluzione concreta di applicazione della separazione a ciascun settore dovrebbe fondarsi sull'analisi economica delle caratteristiche tecniche e strutturali del mercato relativo. Sebbene non sia possibile teorizzare, in termini astratti, una regola di ottima separazione per l'apertura alla concorrenza dei servizi pubblici italiani, le variazioni di intensità del principio garantiscono l’idoneità dello strumento a soddisfare condizioni applicative differenti nel tempo e nelle circostanze. I maggiori problemi di efficacia di tale misura sono generalmente legati alla capacità dei regolatori nazionali di svilupparne e imporne il rispetto da parte degli operatori del mercato.

Il principio di separazione contabile, societaria e proprietaria nei servizi pubblici

CAROLI CASAVOLA, Hilde
2001-01-01

Abstract

The EU Law on liberalised public services introduced into national legal orders general and sectoral obligations of accounting, corporate and ownership separation between activities carried out under monopoly and activities carried out under market conditions. By examining the specific provisions of the sector, it is possible to define a general legal principle applicable to all services sectors characterized by the existence and relevance of a (structural) network. This conclusion is confirmed by the introduction of an antitrust rule that imposes, as a general rule, for those services, an obligation of corporate separation between monopoly and competitive activities. While the requirements of transparency and the promotion of pluralism make it, on the one hand, an antitrust principle and, on the other, a principle of asymmetric regulation, certain conflicts nevertheless arise between the respective disciplines (the regulatory one and the competitive one). The concrete solution of applying unbundling to each sector should be based on an economic analysis of the technical and structural characteristics of the relevant market. Although it is not possible to theorize, in abstract terms, an optimal unbundling rule for the opening to competition of Italian public services, variations in the intensity of the principle guarantee the suitability of the instrument to meet different application conditions in time and circumstances. The greatest problems of effectiveness of such a measure are generally linked to the ability of national regulators to develop and enforce compliance by market operators.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11695/5778
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